The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are an undisputed national symbol. Their story is tightly intertwined with Canadian history and has been since its predecessor forces, the Dominion Police and the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, were organized in the early years after Confederation. They have played their part in some of our country’s brightest days as well as its darkest. They brought law and order to our western frontier and prevented it from becoming another “Wild West”, but persecuted aboriginals. They kept Canada safe from foreign intrusion during two World Wars, but actively participated in the internment of Germans and Japanese immigrants.
Last month, former Supreme Court justice John Major shed new light on a dark chapter of the RCMP’s history. He blamed the RCMP and Canada’s domestic intelligence agency, CSIS, for making a series of catastrophic mistakes that led to the bombing of Air India flight 182 by Sikh separatists in late June, 1985. The bombing remains the largest mass murder in modern Canadian history with 320 dead, 280 of whom were Canadians. Major warned that, though the bombing had happened 25 years ago, little has changed about how the RCMP conducts its counter-terrorism activities and that the tragic mistakes that led to the bombing could easily reoccur.
Just days before Major issued his chilling warning, Public Safety minister Vic Toews announced proposed changes to how complaints about the RCMP will be investigated. The changes, which would include creating a powerful new complaints commission would bring much needed accountability to the RCMP, argued Toews. They would do little, however, to prevent another Air India-type bombing. Though the investigation leads the RCMP to change its policies, we cannot afford to wait for another devastating terrorist attack to review them. Instead, we need a commission which would both be able to investigate complaints and initiate its own reviews of RCMP policies, especially those related to national security.

This is precisely what Ontario Court of Appeal judge Dennis O’Connor called for in his own report on Canada’s role in the kidnapping and torture of Maher Arar by American officials in cooperation with Syrian intelligence authorities. He argued that the mandate of CSIS’s oversight committee, composed of five distinguished lawyers, should be expanded to include the RCMP’s national security activities. Such a solution might cause more problems than it would solve, however, since it would distract CSIS’s committee from its principal mission.
It would not be hard to come up with an alternative solution. For instance, the government’s proposed commission could be established, but along with it another review body could be organized to review the RCMP’s national security activities. However, this approach ignores the fundamental problem which Major flagged in his report. The kind of ordinary law enforcement that makes up much of the RCMP’s core activities requires a very different relationship than counter-terrorism. National security activities are far more politically sensitive and require more direct control because they can easily put the rights of Canadians in jeopardy.
While the RCMP’s oversight system leaves a lot to be desired, the most important problem with the organization is its structure. In Canada, the RCMP is not only the federal police force (charged with investigating federal crimes like counterfeiting and organized crime), but is sometimes also the local police force on contract with either the municipality, province, or territory in question. Combining such different functions, which in other countries would be split between multiple agencies, creates a significant headache for political leaders, because while they need to intervene heavily in areas like counter-terrorism, they need to steer clear of unduly influencing ordinary law enforcement.
The only solution to this problem is to split the RCMP into two different agencies. The first would be responsible for investigating federal crimes, including terrorism. The second would be responsible for carrying out duties which other municipal, provincial, and territorial governments in Canada. In most provinces, especially large ones like Alberta and British Columbia, local policing should be transferred to provincial police forces, but current budgetary pressures might make that unlikely. Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario and Quebec already have provincial police forces.
Reforming the RCMP will not be easy or popular, but this does not make it any less necessary. Unless the government moves swiftly to do so, any effort it makes to implement Justice Major’s recommendations to prevent another Air India bombing will leave Canada dangerously vulnerable to attack. Separating counterterrorism from local law enforcement is the only way that the government can make good on what has so far been a costly commitment to safeguard Canadians from terrorism.









The Royal Canadian Mounted Police not only investigate federal crimes (i.e. counterfeiting), but also acts as a local police force. Photo by Sam Cazon


Comments
There has been a lot of discussion lately on what the police did wrong during the G20 summit: they didn't protect commercial hubs like Queen st. or Yonge st.; they arrested hundreds without charge; they have been accused of turning Toronto into a police state. Sure, this may be true, but what the discussion seems to be lacking is what mistakes the protesters made.
So why did the protesters choose to march? A simple answer is that marches are relatively easy to organize and take little planning. All that is required is a meeting time and place and whatever props and signs the crowd feels inspired to bring. However, this is the post-9/11 era where priority on security (especially when the American president is involved) is at an all time high. Summits are known to attract the worst kinds of troublemakers and an environment of fear had already fallen on Toronto long before the Black Bloc ever set foot within our city limits. Politicians and police were well prepared to keep protesters out of the conference centre both physically and politically. In other words, it was clear the situation called for a new kind of protest and that some extra creativity would be required to make a strong statement while keeping the spotlight on the causes the protesters held so dear. To my disappointment, that creativity never surfaced.
1) Hold the marches and rallies in the weeks leading up to the summit. This is not only when you have the highest chance getting leaders' attention and of impacting summit talks, but its also when you have to lowest chance of your event being hijacked by criminal elements.
2) Pick a central message. Only the most careful observer could absorb the myriad issues for which protesters were advocating. Picking a central message to be chanted intermittently as a collective would have cut down on the confusion and would have had a much stronger impact. 3) During the summit, select a tactic the vandals aren't expecting. Create the opposite of chaos. Stand. Sit. Create a dramatic atmosphere that's hard to ignore or be loud and obnoxious, but BE STILL and SPREAD OUT. This would have avoided providing cover to vandals and thus reduced tension with the police.
4) Work with the police. During the summits police were purposely kept in the dark about march routes for fear of police interference. With the numbers of policemen and women flown in for this event, avoiding police inference with so many protesters was going to be impossible. By working with the police, protesters would have been able to operate in an environment of cooperation that would have ensured protests were be both safe and effective.
Jul 6, 2010 at 10:24 AM
Sorry, wrong copy and paste! Varsity, please feel free to remove the above comment. Great article, Patrick!
Jul 6, 2010 at 10:29 AM
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