On Sunday, March 2, Vladimir Putin stood onstage and congratulated Dmitry Medvedev, his hand-picked successor, on his presidential election victory. Putin strongly believes that Medvedev would ensure that Russia continues its steady path, agreeing to be his second in command in the role of Prime Minister when Medvedev formally takes over as President in May.
Yet not everyone is so sure of Russia’s course. Radio Free Europe’s Gordon A. Hahn adamantly wrote: “It is now time to cease using the terms such as ‘managed democracy,’ ‘illiberal democracy,’ and even ‘hybrid regime’ with respect to Russia. It is now clear that in the course of 2002-03, the regime in Russia underwent a gently imposed transition from its rather weak ‘illiberal’ democratic form of rule to a soft authoritarian regime.”
The government of Russia has transformed into a centralized executive body under the law of Putin’s way. This soft authoritarian regime has eliminated opposition leaders and parties, ensuring that the power rests in the hands of the hegemonic presidency. The future of Russia lies in two directions: a steady path towards a soft authoritarian government, or ethnic minorities that will strategically mobilize against this centralized power in strong opposition.
A soft authoritarian Russia may continue because while autonomous associations (opposition political parties) exist within society, their opportunities to shape policy and pursue political office are limited by legal initiatives. These laws restrict the ability of opposition parties to function—they have no access to state resources such as election commissions, prosecutors, and the courts.
Another manoeuvre the Kremlin uses to its advantage is a direct application of administrative resources during elections to create outcomes in their favour. Administrative resources are often used by the Kremlin authorities to restrict the use of campaign venues for opposition parties. The same resources are used to calculate the result of elections, which makes the Russian elections questionable, to say the least.
Russia’s other path involves ethnic minorities strategically mobilizing against central powers to create a strong opposition. These are helped by amendments in Russian law that prohibit political parties based on minority ethnic, religious or linguistic groups from running for elections. Clearly, isolating ethnic and religious minorities from the political process may result in ethno-political conflict and mobilization. The Kremlin has ensured that their power is seemingly secure because opposition parties’ and candidates’ chances of winning are reduced to near nil, leading to a violent uprising on the part of minorities and opposition members.
Consider the federal assembly. Under Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, there was a balance between the branches of government. Parliament managed to keep Yeltsin in check and influence public policy. Yeltsin was often unable to implement his own reforms regarding the economy and political structures, as such initiatives had limited parliamentary support. Opposition to Yeltsin grew and the majority of parliament moved farther away from him. The lower house in the parliament, also known as the Duma, became an important arena for dealings among powerful organized interests.
When Putin came into power, this changed dramatically. The Duma was no longer an arena for confrontations between the president and the opposition. Instead, it became an instrument for legislative endorsement. Putin’s centralized and disciplined policymaking has led to the re-engineering of the internal procedures of both chambers of parliament to guarantee him consistent and reliable majorities.
As bad as the democratic devolution seems, it also suggests that Russia’s political system is still susceptible to evolution in how its constitutional structure operates. If political parties become more effective in gathering the interests of Russia’s voters, the parliaments will become an important arena for decision and deliberation. Both the paths mentioned above seem increasingly plausible given the circumstances of Russia’s limiting and super presidential system, yet if resistance organizes itself, democracy can indeed return to Russia.
