If there is one word to describe the Bush administration’s approach to North Korea, it’s “clumsy.” Last week, North Korea made headlines when it barred inspectors from examining its Yongbyon nuclear facilities. This strategic move elicited the desired effect: on October 12, the White House announced that it had removed the country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The administration couldn’t abide a nuclear North Korea, and because of its concession, it lost diplomatic leverage.
North Korea has once again allowed the inspectors into Yongbyon, but problems are far from over. Inspectors are only allowed to examine the Yongbyon reactor (which uses plutonium-based technology) despite suspicions of a separate uranium enrichment program elsewhere. Disabling the Yongbyon reactor would mean nothing if North Korea acquired nuclear capabilities through other means.
Why is the U.S. so concerned about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities? Do they really expect the country to attack with nuclear missiles? These questions stem from the popular notion that the Bush administration is paranoid, and convinced that every non-friendly state is out to assassinate Uncle Sam. The truth is that the U.S. is more worried about its own military bases in South Korea and Japan getting bombed than it is about an attack on American soil. If North Korea has nuclear capabilities, it could start a serious arms race in East Asia. Nuclear bombs might be placed in South Korea, as they were during the early Cold War, and Japan might to follow suit.
The North Korean government has deliberately established itself as irrational. It’s as if they are announcing, “Yes, we are crazy enough to drop nuclear bombs, and we don’t care whether you bomb our citizens in return.” Policymakers’ beliefs fluctuate with regard to whether or not this is in earnest. When North Korea threatens to go over the edge, it wants to be pulled back, and the U.S. did just that. Some Asian bloggers have dubbed the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic dance as a “push-and-pull game of love.” It’s a silly metaphor, until you consider that the opponent is as enigmatic and unpredictable as North Korea.
As some policymakers have realized, the U.S. and its allies need to use more carrots than sticks when dealing with North Korea—oil and food, to raise the stakes and aid the country’s citizens. For now, North Korea’s brinkmanship diplomacy seems to be working. But brinkmanship can only go so far before disaster erupts—an open, diplomatic dialogue is necessary for a peaceful solution. The Bush administration’s removal of North Korea from the state-sponsored terrorism list was a misstep, but a concession. In return, the nation should consider allowing the U.S. and its allies to examine other parts of its territory—if they really want peace and economic security, that is.
