The West should intervene in Libya
Libya has come a long way in the past decade. Not only is it no longer regarded as a state sponsor of terrorism, but it has also renounced its nuclear ambitions and shuttered its biological and chemical weapons programs. However, the Libyan government’s repressive actions in recent weeks have seriously jeopardized this progress. In response to widespread protests and even outright rebellion — particularly in oil-rich eastern Libya — Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi has ordered his military to open fire on protestors. So far, mercenaries and Libyan soldiers have killed at least 1,000 civilians and an unknown number of rebels.
There is no end in sight. Forces loyal to Qaddafi are stepping up their attacks on cities and towns throughout eastern Libya. They have used bombers, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships to decimate rebel positions. Though some Libyan military units have defected to the rebel cause, Qaddafi loyalists still control much of the heavy weaponry — including artillery — which they have used to bombard eastern Libyan cities. Whether the current conflict transforms into a protracted civil war or whether, as some fear, Qaddafi prevails in the next few months, the killing will continue indefinitely.
Though it is not clear what a post-Qaddafi Libya would look like, it is clear that the current state of violence is untenable. President Obama and others are right to stand with Libyan rebels and against the merciless killings perpetrated by Qaddafi’s forces. Since it is becoming increasingly clear that the current asset freezes and sanctions will not be enough to stop the violence, it is time that the United States and its allies, including Canada, step up their commitment to protect Libyan civilians and assist the burgeoning rebellion. This means putting an immediate end to Qaddafi’s ability to have his own people killed.
Due to objections by China and Russia, it is unlikely that the United Nations Security Council will be able to pass a resolution endorsing military intervention soon enough to prevent catastrophic killings. Instead, it is more likely that the NATO members, including Britain, Canada, and the United States will agree to intervene within the next few weeks. The intervention would resemble the 1999 bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia, which put an end to nearly a decade of ethnic conflict in that country, particularly in Kosovo. If NATO members cannot agree on intervention, it is possible that the United States might act alone or in cooperation with a few other countries as it did when it invaded Iraq in 2003.
No matter which countries are involved (though it is very likely that the United States will take the lead in any intervention) and what level of international approval is secured, the campaign against the Libyan military would likely proceed in three parts. The intervening countries would deploy their air forces to southern Europe and the Mediterranean, from which they would then launch bombing campaigns against Libyan military bases. They would especially target airfields and hangars, in order to deny Qaddafi the ability to use helicopters and jets to attack rebels in eastern Libya.
Once the Libyan military is incapacitated, the intervening force would need to create a no-fly zone. This would ensure that no more mercenaries could be flown into Libya. This would also prevent the Libyan air force from using civilian airports. These must be kept intact so that other states, including Canada, can continue to relocate their citizens and if necessary, launch humanitarian missions. The no-fly zone would require deploying significant air forces to the region, both to bases in southern Europe and northern Africa, but also on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean.
To further ensure that Qaddafi is forced to capitulate, the intervening force would also need to blockade Libya’s ports to ensure that no more weapons are imported and that no more oil is exported. To keep oil prices from shooting up, the United States would draw on its strategic reserves to temporarily fuel the American economy until oil production quotas elsewhere were raised. Without oil revenues, Qaddafi will no longer be able to hire foreign mercenaries nor will he continue to be able to arm his remaining military forces. While it is possible that mercenaries and weapons will be brought in by land, the flow will be slower and easier for Libya’s neighbours to control, if they are pressured to do so.
Once these three policies are implemented, it is unlikely that the mass killings or Qaddafi’s rule would last much longer. He would likely disappear into exile or be captured and tried by a new government. It is neither clear what would happen next nor what role the interveners would have in the new Libya. While a transitional government has been formed in eastern Libya, it might fall victim to tribal infighting; be co-opted by Islamist forces, which have so far been kept at bay by Qaddafi’s regime; or it might quietly succeed. No matter what Libya’s future holds, the killings of civilians must end immediately. Only a military intervention can ensure this.—Patrick Baud
The West should not intervene in Libya
“The Middle East is on fire!” That is how the popular uprisings from Tehran to Rabat are being portrayed. The usual response of human beings to fire — especially an unexpected one — is to try to put it out. We have a natural inclination to try to solve a problem when we see one. However, we should be wary of trying to “fix” the situation in the Middle East. In the course of recent events, Libya has taken centre stage. Due to Qaddafi’s slide into mania and his brutal military attacks against civilians we in the West might feel our presence is needed to help guide the conflict to a peaceful resolution. Luckily, we seem to have learned our lesson when it comes to direct military intervention. Whether from recent misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan or the Western overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, which ultimately led to the Iranian Revolution and the creation of a radical theocracy, we seem to understand that, when we attempt to create a more appealing regime, it often ends up worse than when we started.Unfortunately, the appeal of protecting our “interests” in the region may prove too great a temptation for Western leaders. Already, the U.S., Canada, and the EU have independently placed an arms, travel, and trade embargo on Libya. Likewise, the UN Security Council has voted unanimously in favour of similar sanctions.
All these things sound good; it would be hard to argue that we should be selling arms to a murderous dictator, or filling their personal bank accounts with oil money. While such sanctions may seem like a good idea, we should look at what has resulted when we have used our “soft power” on other countries in the past.
In the early 1990s, Bosnian and Serb forces clashed in the former Yugoslavia. During this time, Serb forces undertook a program of ethnic cleansing, murdering hundreds of thousands of ethnic Bosnians. In 1991, the UN Security Council placed an arms embargo on all of former Yugoslavia, in an attempt to prevent the conflict from escalating. Unfortunately, this did not happen. As former Bosnian president Haris Silajdzic later explained, the “arms embargo led to[…] a quarter of a million deaths – an embargo that penalized only the victims, for the aggressors already had more arms than they could handle.” Because the Serbian government had inherited the equipment of the Yugoslav army, the breakaway Bosnians were unable to arm themselves in defence. The Bosnian forces were at the mercy of Serbian forces until NATO intervened militarily — which, for over 200,000 Bosnian civilians, happened too late. The Bosnian civilians were, of course, only at the mercy of the Serb army because they were unable to arm themselves with weapons purchased outside of Yugoslavia. By not understanding the military reality on the ground, the UN worsened the situation and condemned hundreds of thousands of civilians to death. Similarly in Libya, or indeed any dictatorship today, the government is already well equipped; the people, though, remain unarmed and defenceless.
What if, instead of stopping arms sales, we simply stopped the flow of goods and capital into the affected country? This was attempted before when, from 1990 to 2003, the UN imposed strict sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the wake of its invasion of Kuwait. Instead of toppling his regime, Hussein held onto power while upwards of 500,000 Iraqi civilians died from starvation, lack of access to medical supplies, and other circumstances resulting from the sanctions.
The travel ban is perhaps the oddest to confront. After all, why would anyone want Qaddafi or his cabal in Canada? As a liberal democracy, we are generally averse to murderous dictators. However, by not giving Qaddafi an out, we have forced him to make Libya his last stand. If he loses Libya, he has nowhere to go but the International Criminal Court. If we gave Qaddafi the option of setting up his signature Bedouin tent in Rosedale, despite our initial revulsion, we would free his people from further battles for control of their country.
The last thing we should do is get our fingerprints on these revolutions. Their strength comes from the fact that they are popular uprisings against oppressive and unpopular governments. If we involve ourselves in some vain attempt to right the wrongs of the world, we will rob them of the unique character from which they gain their strength. They will become, whether rightly or wrongly, Western-orchestrated imperialist constructs attempting to put in place a puppet regime. The people will feel their interests lost and their voices once again silenced. Like a tree that occasionally needs forest fires to grow and be healthy, this is not a fire we should try to put out. —David Woolley
