Although he architects of the war in Afghanistan and its inheritors — President Obama chief among them — have desperately avoided comparisons between it and the Vietnam War, the similarities are undeniable. Though allied and civilian casualties are far fewer, and United States forces have been joined by a greater number of countries, including Canada, the war seems headed to a similar end. Talk of victory by the American government has diminished in recent months, and been replaced with suggestions of a dignified retreat. The last chopper out of Kabul may be much closer than we think.
Since the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden in early May by American special forces, secret talks have begun between allied forces and representatives of the Taliban. When Afghan President Ha- mid Karzai — whose relations with allied commanders have become increasingly strained in recent years — revealed the negotiations with the Taliban last week, they came as a shock to many. Years of denial by military leaders and politicians alike that negotiations were an option had dimmed hope that anything but a stalemate could result. While this armistice may not be negotiated in Paris, as at the end of the Vietnam War, it could have a similar effect.
Mere days after the revelation of negotiation efforts, President Obama also announced plans to withdraw 10,000 American soldiers from Afghanistan in July and an ad- ditional 20,000 before the end of the summer. This is major reversal from a president who had enthusiastically backed a surge of forces in 2009. The surge has simply not met its objectives, the most important of which was reducing the Taliban’s capacity to launch bombings and suicide attacks with impunity. Moreover, it may also mean that a majority of American combat troops may be withdrawn from Afghanistan ahead of the planned withdrawal in December 2014.
Despite significant efforts by allied forces to prepare the Afghan military and police to take on se- curity responsibilities, many units remain undertrained and unprepared. Unlike in Iraq, where there were a significant number of low- level veterans who could be quickly trained to provide law and order, Afghanistan has had little in the way of formal government. Barring a collapse of the Taliban military organization, it seems inevitable that they will eventually overthrow Karzai’s weak central government.
Unlike in Vietnam, there was re- ally never a viable alternative to the opponents in Afghanistan. It is not clear how the Americans could change this in the final years of the war nor how they could continue to prop up the Afghan government after 2014 without suffering unacceptable casualties and taking on billions in additional war debt. It is undesirable for allied forces to remain in Afghanistan, but it is equally undesirable that they leave. The risk is that they will have left Afghanistan more unstable than ever before and that it will return to anarchy and civil war.
Another variable in the post- withdrawal scenario is the fate of Al Qaeda. While it has been signifi- cantly weakened by a decade of tar- geted operations by countless security agencies and military forces, its ideas have spread. While the partic- ular Al Qaeda cell led by Bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan may no longer be able to mount attacks, there may be doz- ens or hundreds more elsewhere who can. Particularly disconcern- ing are so-called “homegrown” cells which do not need to contend with entering Western countries to mount attacks.
The Americans are right to pursue an armistice with the Taliban. However, no one should be delud- ed into thinking that such a peace would mark the end of the conflict between Islamist terror and Western governments. Instead, we can expect to return to the kind of con- frontations that were the rule in the 1990s. The current war with Libya indicates a continued willingness among Western leaders to undertake air wars. Moreover, it is also likely that the American govern- ment will continue its worldwide covert campaign against terrorism through drone attacks and paramilitary operations.
The Vietnam War was the final major proxy conflict of the Cold War, but the United States contin- ued its covert operations against communist movements around the world until the dying days of the Soviet Union. The time for peace is now, but the larger war is
not likely to end soon nor is Afghani- stan likely to enjoy much stability in the near future. While our Vietnam has been quieter, largely free of mass demonstrations and large-scale ca- sualties, it will almost undoubtedly have a similar outcome — the original enemy will take over. What is not clear is whether we will be able to avoid another Afghanistan again.
