Does Russian president Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tehran signal the formation of a new strategic alliance between the ex-Soviet republic and the Islamic revolutionary state? Upon initial consideration, the answer seems apparent given that U.S. post-9/11 interventionist military policies have irked the governments of both countries. But looking past the political theatre, it is painfully obvious that Russia is demonstrating diplomatic maneuvering not seen since the height of its power during the Cold War. The association with Tehran will last only so long as it is in Russia’s national interest, and Russia is only using Iran as a stepping stone on its rising path back to its role as a great power on the international stage.

Putin’s visit was hailed in the Iranian press as a victory for the country’s position on the nuclear issue. Iran’s leaders have been desperate to gain international support in light of the two rounds of imposed sanctions by the UN Security Council which have put the squeeze on Iran’s tanking economy. Putting aside historical animosities, which had peaked after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1975, Putin was received by both President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Islamic Revolution Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei—a sure demonstration of Tehran’s determination to court Russia’s support. The question is, at what price?

Notwithstanding the urge to exploit any opportunity to stick it to the United States, Russia’s foreign policy is a complex creature. Spurred on by the skyrocketing price of oil in the past five years, Russia is on-track to re-establishing itself as an international superpower. With the U.S. facing formidable challenges in Iraq, the scent of injured prey has emboldened even the most reluctant of predators. Russia’s primary objective concerning Iran is to prop up the regime, and while Moscow is defending Tehran’s nuclear program (supposedly for civilian purposes), even Putin wants to prevent the mullahs from getting their hands on “the bomb.” Russia’s alliance with Iran is in line with its national interests; the possibility of Iran as an independent nuclear power is not.

Besides its strategic benefits, the alliance also has positive economic repercussions for Russia. The ever-present threat that the U.S. could invade Iran is proving profitable for Russia’s weapons industries. Already, Iran’s leaders have purchased a $700 million air defense system from Russia. These are not going to be the last petrodollars finding their way to the Kremlin.

After having witnessed seven years of his administration, we should recognize that Putin, for better or for worse, is a shrewd politician. Despite the appearance of friendship, Putin is all too familiar with the irrationality of Islamic revolutionaries, and in light of Iran’s geographical proximity to Russia, will not support Iran’s presupposed determination to build a nuclear bomb.

The degree to which Russia has control over Iran’s nuclear program is uncertain; however, demonstrations of support such as Putin’s visit to Tehran pose an obstacle to the West. If the West is truly concerned about the prospects of a nuclear-capable Iran, it will have to come to terms with Russia’s re-emergence as a great power and its determination to exercise its strategic and economic muscle in the region. In short, the U.S. is going to have to play ball. The merits of Russia’s re-ascendance are not immediately apparent, but it is about time we re-evaluate the U.S. leadership in the nuclear standoff and consider whether it is capable of diplomatically resolving this issue under the administration of George Bush, the bumbling “decision-maker.”