The uprisings that have swept through the Middle East and North Africa since January seemed to come out of nowhere. Although few experts doubted that the increasingly young, but disenfranchised populations of these countries would have a major effect on their politics, most expected that these populations would become radicalized and eventually replace the absolute monarchies and dictatorships in the region with Iranian-style theocracies. Instead the movement, which has toppled the governments of Egypt and Tunisia and currently threatens those of Libya and Yemen, is not primarily a religiously-oriented movement. This has reminded outsiders not to discount the possibility that youth might be a moderating, rather than a radicalizing, force in the region.
Whatever view we take of the situation, both in general and in specific countries, it’s not clear what is to come. Some states such as Saudi Arabia, whose governments’ hold on power is relatively strong, have nevertheless adopted reforms that would have been unthinkable as little as a few months ago. Other states such as Egypt and Tunisia, whose immediate futures are far more uncertain, are also preparing for their first reforms in decades. For some, this liberalization is a clear sign that this is the Arab world’s 1989 moment, recalling the year that communism — especially in Eastern Europe — rapidly crumbled.
For others, however, the reform efforts are unlikely to succeed because an Islamist takeover is not far away. For them, 2011 (or perhaps 2012) will soon come to resemble 1979, the year when the Iranian revolution was co-opted by Islamists who quickly turned Iran into a theocracy. While it’s unclear whether the Arab world is on the verge of being swept by a wave of liberalization or Islamism, it’s likely that either trend would be tempered by country-specific factors such as the role of the military in Egypt and the influence of the French government in Tunisia.
Due to these factors, it’s likely that the next few years will more closely resemble the period starting in the 1950s when several burgeoning constitutional monarchies and republics in the Arab world were toppled by civilian or military coups. This was the case not only in Egypt, where the military has ruled since 1952, and Tunisia, where former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali took power in a bloodless coup in 1987, but also in Iraq and Syria. While there had been hope in the 1950s and 1960s for liberalization, as there is now, there is also the possibility that new authoritarian governments could take hold amidst the chaos.
However significant the liberalization that takes place in Egypt and Tunisia, it is likely that whatever form of democracy is developed in both countries will be flawed. In Egypt, this will largely be because of the tremendous role played by the military in Egyptian society, both as a national icon, and because of its involvement in most sectors of the Egyptian economy. The military’s interest in preserving its role will give it incentive to ensure that someone sympathetic to its interests prevails in elections planned for the fall, while its broad-based popular support will give it the power to do so. In Tunisia, this will be less for structural reasons than because of the effects of Ben Ali’s repressive rule.
Despite these challenges, the West possesses several important tools to influence the future of both states. Chief among these is the American military’s close relationship with the Egyptian military, which is based not only on the significant military aid that the United States provides Egypt, but also training programmes which see Egyptian officers studying at American military schools. American military leaders can exert significant pressure on their Egyptian counterparts, which they are sure to have done at the height of the protests in January and February, to ensure that they behave properly. Although it has historically been loath to use its power to issue demands, the French government continues to exert significant influence in Tunisia, its former colony, to ensure preferential treatment for its companies and to maintain the welfare of its expatriates.
Beyond Egypt and Tunisia, the wave of uprisings sweeping the Middle East and North Africa seems to have slowed. The exception is Libya, which has become embroiled in a virtual civil war. It’s clear that the uprisings have served as a warning for autocrats and monarchs alike. What remains unclear, however, is what the long term effect will be, particularly in countries which have not seen their governments overthrown. The structural causes that led directly, or indirectly, to the uprisings — such as high unemployment, particularly among youth; high food prices; and the effects of long-term political repression — persist throughout the region.
These structural problems will also be challenging for the caretaker governments in Egypt and Tunisia as well as the new governments formed following the upcoming elections. The expectations for change are high in the wake of the uprisings, but the ability of the new governments to tackle these problems in the near-term is limited. This is especially true in Tunisia, where the first new prime minister since the revolution has already been forced out of office. Due to the influence of the military in Egypt, the lead up to the elections in October will likely be smoother, but protests pressing for faster reform continue.
In order to address these problems, it will be time for governments in the Arab world to once again, for some, and finally, for others, attempt to diversify and modernize their stagnant economies. Maintaining price controls is crucial for basic staples in the near-term, but facilitating and encouraging true competition in other sectors would help fuel growth and provide opportunities for foreign investment. Moreover, gradually privatizing state-owned companies and creating a modern regulatory environment would also help drive economic growth. These economic reforms are especially important for states without significant oil and gas resources. Even relatively oil-rich states can benefit from diversification to insulate themselves against day-to-day price drops and prepare for the inevitable decline in production.
Moreover, it will also be time for governments to dismantle aging and costly war machines and replace them with more modern defence forces. This will be especially challenging in countries such as Egypt which have large conscripted militaries, and whose military leaders exert a significant influence on national politics. However, cutting military spending would immediately reduce the tax burden on economies in the region while also allowing governments to invest in a broader social safety net aimed at curbing the negative effects of high unemployment.
It will also be time for governments in the region to finally embrace fuller civil and political rights, as the governments of Bahrain and Kuwait have begun to do in recent decades. This means not only embracing greater political freedom by allowing free, internationally-monitored elections, but also ending censorship and limits on freedom of assembly. These freedoms will likely not be granted immediately, but will come as part of a package of gradual liberalization. What is less clear is how they will be better protected than they have been in the past.
Constitutions and courts offer little hope, as they have been serially co-opted and suspended. Instead, it may be up to the populations of these countries to hold their governments to account directly, as they have in these uprisings. All of these changes are likely to come piecemeal and would easily be undermined, especially if there are attempts either by the military or by Islamists to unduly influence the future of their countries. The West might attempt to create incentives for change, as the United States has unexpectedly done by having its military cultivate a close relationship with Egyptian military leaders. But the West cannot easily punish leaders who stray from change without fanning the flames of anti-imperialism. Nor should we, except in cases of egregious human rights violations.
Any change will undoubtedly come at the price of stability. Where Western governments had sought to keep autocrats in power in the past because they believed that they alone would keep the oil flowing into their economies and not reinitiate hostilities against Israel and, more recently, because they alone would keep the Islamist tide at bay, there is now a choice. Change has swept the Middle East and North Africa. Hopefully it will eventually mean that new democratic governments will form in Egypt and Tunisia, but it’s not unthinkable that parties hostile to some or all of these approaches will come to power.
The hope, however, is that the new democracies will be better able to respond to the concerns of their people and take steps to act on them. If they can do that, the result will ultimately be a more stable region. Since the effect of the revolutions that have swept the Middle East and North Africa will be long term, it’s crucial that the West takes a long-term view in deciding how to respond to them. Cautious optimism, in this case, seems to be the right way forward.
