In the hours immediately after the attacks of 9/11, then-Canadian ambassador Michael Kergin had some crisis management to do.
In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States government froze the US-Canadian border, through which $1.4 billion of commerce flow each day, and diverted around 3700 US-bound airline passengers to Canada. What motivated these moves?
“Fear,” said Kergin last Thursday at Isabel Bader Theatre-fear of more terrorist attacks via Canada.
Kergin spoke at an evening of discussion on the nature of Canada’s role in international diplomacy presented by the Association of Political Science Students (APSS) .
The event, held at the Isabel Bader theatre, was led by Kergin and David Wright, both past Canadian ambassadors to the United States and NATO.
Kergin, a U of T alumnus, and Wright, the Kenneth and Patricia Taylor Distinguished Visiting Professor in Foreign Affairs at Victoria College, both began their careers in the Canadian Foreign Service. They were keen to bring their insights and experiences in the real world of politics to a crowd of political science students and others.
“Fear is a terrible thing. It’s irrational,” Kergin said, referring to the consequences of 9/11. 84 per cent of Canadian exports go south of the border, closed by a skittish U.S. government. Kergin had to think quickly.
The key to diplomatic relations, he stressed, is classic negotiation. In this situation, political sensitivity and diminishing fear through increased security was necessary.
By December 2002, Kergin and a group of ministers from Canada and the U.S. had created a 30-point plan to address and improve security and trade-“which aren’t mutually exclusive,” he quipped-based on risk management and information technology. Kergin called the endeavour “the unsung success of that period.”
“Often our problem is getting attention and profile,” said Wright. “Especially in a place like Washington, with lobbyists running around all over the place.”
Kosovo was different. He and the other ambassadors of the 19 NATO-member countries were given incredible latitude in decision-making, given the quick development of the conflict. When Slobodan Milosevic refused to Western countries’ requests, Wright said that they had to make a decision that night.
“We had to act quickly, get the international community involved, and avoid another Rwanda,” he said.
Wright was hoping Kosovo would set the standard for international involvement and “war by committee.” However, given the brutality of the 9/11 attacks, Wright said U.S. foreign policy-makers didn’t look at Kosovo the same way during their 2003 invasion of Iraq.
“The greater risk,” Wright said, “is [the Americans] withdrawing, and not helping out [in international affairs], rather than them intervening anywhere and everywhere.”
Wright ended on an ominous note.
“The events in Iraq make it less likely that we’ll take things such as Darfur as seriously.”
